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Abstract  
We propose that foresight can contribute to inclusive development by making innovation 
policy processes more inclusive, which in turn makes innovation systems more inclusive. 
Processes of developing future-oriented innovation policies are often unsuccessful and rarely 
inclusive. We conceptualize such processes as foresighting. We focus on how the ex-ante 
design of policymaking processes affects the actual process with a focus on inclusion, and we 
discuss how it affects policy effectiveness and innovation system transformation. Our 
argument is that processes of policymaking must be inclusive to affect and transform 
innovation systems because a set of distributed actors, rather than ministries and innovation 
agencies, is the gatekeepers of change. From this perspective, inclusion is a precondition 
rather than an obstacle for transformation. We develop a conceptual framework and use it to 
study design and processes in two foresight cases in two emerging economies - Brazil and 
South Korea. Although the research is exploratory and the results tentative, the empirical 
studies support our main propositions.  
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1 Introduction 
From the perspective of evolutionary economics, learning and innovation are the most 
important processes in development (Nelson, 2008). Including people in learning and 
innovation activities is thus a central part of inclusive development. The nature, extent and 
direction of innovation activities are strongly influenced by a set of social structures that we 
often refer to as innovation systems. Making such systems more inclusive will thus promote 
inclusive development. We propose here that foresight may help us bring about more 
inclusive innovation systems. 
Ministries of finance, industry or science and technology in developing countries often 
produce ambitious plans and related innovation policies for strengthening and connecting 
science and technology (S&T) and industry activities to support innovation systems. Too 
often, such strategic initiatives fail. We suggest that one important explanatory factor behind 
failed policies can be found in the design of the very process of generating them. We argue 
that whether the process of developing future-oriented innovation policy
1
 is inclusive or 
exclusive has important consequences for its likelihood of having an effect ex post. We 
conceptualize the process developing strategic innovation policy as foresight. Foresight is an 
important and widely used instrument for future-oriented policymaking and for “wiring up” 
innovation systems (Martin & Johnston, 1999).  
Foresight is currently undergoing a two-tracked transformation. First, it is in a process of 
attaining stronger theoretical foundations as the field moves from being practice-oriented 
towards increasingly becoming a scientific discipline. Second, it is in a process of 
implementing a systemic and evolutionary understanding of innovation. In earlier work, we 
have suggested ‘innovation system foresight’ (ISF) as a tentative framework that can bring 
forward this dual transformation (Andersen & Andersen, 2014). ISF is a tool for strategically 
guiding innovation system (IS) transformations in desirable directions, e.g., towards more 
inclusivity. Nonetheless, such transformations are feasible only if the structural design 
underlying foresight adheres to the basic ideas of ISF. These include a systemic understanding 
of innovation, which demands a focus on context specificities and relatively broad social 
inclusion. Hence, our main proposition is that ISF can not only possibly ensure more 
                                                 
1 We refer to innovation policy in the “broad” sense (Lundvall & Borrás, 2005). Furthermore, we use the terms 
“strategic” and “future-oriented” innovation policy interchangeably.   
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inclusivity in innovation policymaking but also enhance the ‘effectiveness’ of it. From this 
perspective, inclusion is a precondition rather than an obstacle for transformation. To achieve 
transformations, governments must build and institutionalize competences for inclusive 
public-private dialogue around innovation policy.  
The effect of social inclusion on innovation and development is an emergent research area 
(Heeks et al., 2014; Johnson & Andersen, 2012). The theme has hitherto largely been ignored 
in both innovation and development studies (Cozzens & Sutz, 2014). Thus, despite recent 
activity, it is empirically under-researched and conceptually under-developed (Foster & Heeks, 
2013). Most empirical research on inclusion and innovation focuses on micro-level processes 
(for example, grassroots or frugal innovations), but the importance of broader system 
structures (i.e., institutions) wherein the latter processes are embedded is widely 
acknowledged (Andersen & Johnson, 2015; Cozzens & Sutz, 2014). In this paper, we focus 
on the structural features of innovation policymaking. We thus contribute to the former 
knowledge gap by outlining how foresight can make innovation policy, and in turn innovation 
systems, more inclusive. More precisely, our argument is that the design properties guiding 
the process of innovation policymaking (foresight) to a large extent determine whether its 
output (e.g., growth plan) can be implemented. The idea to combine foresight and innovation 
systems to study inclusive development is novel, and it emerges from the authors’ respective 
experience with innovation studies, technology foresight and development studies.  
Although most research concerns the social inclusion of poor and vulnerable communities, a 
recent initiative from the OECD broadens the notion of inclusion to encompass social, 
industrial, and territorial inclusion into innovation systems (OECD, 2013). A central point is 
that although aiding the poor remains at the core of inclusive development, we must 
acknowledge important interdependencies between the different forms of inclusion. For 
example, including poor people in labour markets depends on the growth of heterogeneous 
firms, and the workplace is often a key arena for learning. The inclusion of poor people into 
learning activities (as education) can help firms succeed via better equipped workers. 
Additionally, firms remain the key drivers of inclusive development and the main actors for 
up-scaling and diffusing inclusive innovations (specific products/services). We focus on 
industrial inclusion and thereby also contribute to research on inclusive development by 
exploring this novel concept empirically. 
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The paper is both conceptually and empirically explorative. We propose that a certain type of 
foresight thinking —innovation system foresight—is particularly conducive to inclusive 
development. Through the use of interviews and secondary data sources, we present 
indicative evidence from case studies in Brazil and South Korea.  
Section two will present the conceptual linkages between foresight, inclusion and innovation 
system transformation. Section three presents our analytical framework and methods. Section 
four presents foresight cases from Brazil and South Korea and their context. Section five 
contains an analysis of cases. Section six concludes. 
2 Foresight, innovation systems and inclusion  
2.1 Inclusive and systemic policymaking  
It is widely recognized that neither a universal recipe for nor a general theory of policymaking 
for innovation exists (Ahlqvist et al., 2012). Nonetheless, policy and strategy development are 
increasingly being interpreted as a continuous, reflexive, distributed, and interactive learning 
process (EFP, 2012). Rodrik (2006, 2010) argues that in the global learning economy, there 
are no simple and universal paths to economic development. Therefore, any path is 
necessarily unclear ex ante, which makes systematic experimentation with policy and 
institutions the only sensible strategy.  
The systemic and distributed character of innovation has implications for inclusion (or 
participation) in the policymaking processes. It has been recognized that the effectiveness—
here understood as the implementation of policies, which is indicated by behavioural changes 
in actors—of policy depends to a large extent on the involvement of a broad range of actors in 
addition to those formally in charge. Due to the complexity of the learning economy, policy 
formulation relies on the knowledge, experience and competence of different stakeholders. 
Because policymakers cannot be understood as perfectly informed social planners, distributed 
policymaking via the inclusion of key stakeholders emerges as a necessary and integral part of 
innovation policy. International experience shows that involving key stakeholders and the 
public in dialogue and decision-making processes is essential to making socially robust 
solutions for new technology (Gibbons, 1999; Mallett, 2013).  
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In this respect, policymaking is to a large extent about aligning expectations and building 
shared visions of the future that can enable the coordination of interdependent actors. Public 
policy thus plays a catalysing role in this perspective, which implies that the process of 
formulating innovation policy and the benefits related to it (process benefits) might be more 
important than actual tangible outputs, such as reports, list of priorities and regulation 
(product outputs) (Ahlqvist et al., 2012). Hence, broad inclusion has a strong instrumental 
value for innovation policy, and policymaking needs to be both systemic and participatory.  
The direction of innovation policy development activities should not be understood as ‘blind’. 
It is directed by the dominant vision of the future—of what a desirable future would be—and 
resolving what are identified as problems in that optic. The influence of the perception of the 
future on the direction of learning and innovation is strong, whether it is explicit or implicit. It 
is not possible to rationally invest in a business, study for a career, save money or even send 
our children to school without making some assumptions about the shape of the future—it is 
thus inherent to decision making (Wehrmeyer et al., 2003). The process of policy 
experimentation should be guided by a deep understanding of current problems and by a 
systematic understanding of what the future might be.  
2.2 Foresight 
Foresight can be understood as a dynamic and systemic planning tool with participatory and 
inclusive elements. It is an activity that aims to build medium- to long-term visions, aimed at 
influencing present day decisions and mobilizing joint actions (Havas et al., 2010). The 
purpose of foresight is thus to imagine different futures and their consequences and, on that 
basis, to engage in informed decision making. It is perceived as a process where new insights 
emerge and capabilities are built rather than a tool for prediction. Foresight thus rests on two 
key assumptions: (i) that the future is not laid out (ii) and that decisions made and actions 
taken today can affect the future. Foresight often functions as a knowledge input to formal 
innovation policymaking (e.g., legislation) that goes on in ministries and parliament. It can 
thus be thought of as an early stage innovation policymaking. A look at the roots of foresight 
gives us a deeper understanding of the concept. 
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2.2.1 Roots of foresight  
Foresight is often considered an area of practice based on three more established traditions: 
technology forecasting, futures studies and technology assessment. 
Technology forecasting is predicting a future technological development. This tradition has its 
roots in the aftermath of World War II, when the American military needed a systematic 
method for making informed judgement regarding the rapid technological development and 
its significance for military defence. In the 1940s and 1950s, large American enterprises 
developed systematic decision-making methods for technological strategic development based 
on such disciplines as strategic planning, operation analysis and econometrics. During the 
1950s and 1960s, forecasting was developed as a tool broadly accepted by large enterprises, 
international organizations and many countries’ governmental administrations (Jantsch, 1967). 
The fact that these methods did not predict the oil crises of the 1970s generated significant 
scepticism about the usefulness and validity of forecasting (particularly in periods of radical 
change), which in turn stimulated the development of other approaches (Miles, 2010).    
According to Miles (2010), foresight is also rooted in a European tradition of futures studies 
established in the 1960s and 1970s (Bell, 2003, 2004). The field of futures studies tends to be 
dominated by professionals from social sciences and the humanities and is seen as an art 
involving creative and imaginative thinking and acting (Martin, 1995). Moreover, the early 
futures studies tradition was characterized by a pessimistic and critical point of view on the 
future and on technology, which partly formed the foundation of the tradition of technology 
assessment. Compared to forecasting, an instrument for concrete decision making, futures 
studies were more focused on stimulating public debate (Miles, 2010).  
Through their point of departure in technology criticism, future studies have formed the basis 
for a third tradition, technology assessment (Miles et al., 2008; Miles, 2008), which involves a 
systematic assessment of the consequences for society and human beings of the introduction 
and use of new technology. Technology assessment has especially contributed to foresight 
with participatory methods. In this context, the participatory method means the broad 
inclusion of citizens in the discussion and assessment of the future development of technology 
and of the challenges to society. In this respect, the technology assessment tradition differs 
from both technology forecasting and future studies, both of which are expert-oriented and 
elitist.   
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The inspiration for the first formulation of foresight partly came in approximately 1980 from 
Japan, whose ‘technological forecasting’ was markedly different from what was going on 
elsewhere. Martin (2010) characterizes technological forecasting as follows: (i) It involves not 
a few experts but thousands of scientists, industrialists, governments officials and others; (ii) 
it considers the demand side of future economic and social needs; (iii) it combines top-down 
and bottom-up elements; (iv) and it emphasizes process -benefits. This led Irvine and Martin 
(1984) to propose the term foresight as a strategic forward-looking technology analysis to be 
used as a public policy tool in priority setting in science and technology. They define it in 
opposition to ‘hindsight’, understood as analysis of the historical process and the origins of 
certain important technological innovations. 
The roots of foresight illustrate a major dividing line between forecast and foresight. 
According to Wehrmeyer et al. (2003), the forecast tradition has failed as a policy 
development tool for a number of reasons. First, it has limited ability to predict discontinuities. 
Second, we cannot predict the social, economic and environmental consequences of technical 
change with any certainty because our systems of knowledge co-evolve with the world. The 
weather does not react to a weather forecast, but the economy does. Third, the accuracy of 
predictions tends to decrease as time horizons grow, partly because the probability that the 
period of analysis will include one or more significant discontinuities increases as a function 
of time. These differences illustrate what foresight is not.  
2.3 Recent developments: Innovation system foresight 
Since Irvine and Martin (1984), foresight has been established as a field of practice in both 
public policymaking and in corporate strategic planning and more recently as a scientific 
discipline. It has been characterized by increasing conceptual broadening and diversity. The 
latter reflects experimentation with and application of diverse rationales as foundation for 
foresight. It has become more participatory and complex and is applied at multiple levels 
across numerous sectors. Despite the growing diversity, recently, parts of the foresight 
academic field have adopted the innovation system approach as its main rationale under the 
notion of innovation system foresight (ISF). This ‘recent’ and more participatory form of 
foresight is a relevant instrument for inclusive development regarding the poor and vulnerable 
(Ely et al., 2010).  
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ISF was formulated in response to a lack of theoretical underpinnings and analytical 
coherency in the area of foresight research and to accommodate the changing perception of 
innovation from a linear to an evolutionary systems perspective. ISF is defined as a systemic, 
systematic, participatory, future-intelligence-gathering and medium- to long-term vision-
building process aimed at present-day decisions and mobilizing joint actions with the purpose 
of transforming innovation systems in desirable directions, e.g., inclusivity or growth 
(Andersen & Andersen, 2014). ISF essentially reflects the acceptance of an evolutionary and 
systemic understanding of innovation. Consequently, innovation policy cannot be developed 
or implemented in a top-down manner. 
A foresight can be described as consisting of three main phases: pre-foresight (design of 
foresight), foresighting (process of foresight) and post-foresight (implementation and 
dissemination of the outputs and outcomes of foresight), with each phase containing a number 
of steps, as seen from figure 1. ISF directly affects the pre-foresight phase, and due to 
interdependency between the phases, it indirectly affects the foresight and post-foresight 
phases. Below, we outline how ISF differs from foresight in general on four points (see more 
detail in Andersen & Andersen, 2014).  
(1) The goal of foresight. In the literature, several goals are mentioned such as setting 
priorities in S&T, guiding innovation systems, shop window for competences, enrolling new 
actors in the S&T debate, and network building (Barré & Keenan, 2008). The main goal of 
ISF is to ‘strengthen’ the innovation system. The aforementioned goals are seen as inputs to 
this principal goal. 
(2) System definition/boundaries. There seems to be no agreed-upon method for setting 
system boundaries and thus classifying factors as external or internal. Boundary setting 
influences the choice of methodology, data collection and stakeholder involvement in 
subsequent steps in the foresight process. ISF suggests following the definition of an 
innovation system as the organizing principle for setting boundaries. The system should 
“include the elements and relationships which interact in the production, diffusion and use of 
new and economically useful knowledge” (Lundvall, 1992).  
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Figure 1: Phases and steps in foresight – based on Andersen and Rasmussen (2012) 
(3) Inclusion. Innovation system transformation requires distributed policy, which in turn 
requires (meaningful) participation of all key stakeholders (representing, e.g., actors, networks, 
infrastructure, institutions). This point is closely related to system definition. A systems 
approach will tend to favour broad inclusion/participation because actors are seen as the 
primary agents, or gatekeepers, of change. Despite being in principle a participatory policy 
instrument, the process of foresight can be more or less inclusive. Actually, so far, broader 
participation in foresight has been limited. Instead, the focus has been on expert groups. One 
can distinguish between narrow and broad foresight. Narrow foresight is based on a forecast 
tradition where only a few key experts are involved, whereas broad foresight includes a much 
wider set of stakeholders. Narrow foresight tends to assume that all new technology is 
beneficial and progressive, whereas broad foresight includes a discussion of the desirability, 
costs, benefits and direction of innovation (Loveridge, 2005). ISF is, in other words, inclusive 
foresight. There is a crucial link between inclusion and the implementation of foresight results 
in the post-foresight phase, which is essential for the usefulness of the exercise. In this sense, 
the initial system definition and the identification and enrolment of key stakeholders partly 
define implementation possibilities. It reflects a systemic interdependency between pre- and 
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post-foresight because if those required to make decisions (gatekeepers) have not been 
included, there is little chance that they will act in accordance with the foresight action plans 
(Cagnin, 2011). 
(4) Mapping the present. There is no widely agreed-upon method for analysing the present 
system situation. The quality of any foresight will depend on the quality of the mapping 
exercise because it will serve as a basis for the following foresighting steps. We suggest an IS 
framework for such analysis.   
2.4 Innovation system foresight and inclusive development   
Foresight adhering to the points outlined about can potentially promote inclusiveness in 
innovation systems through multiple channels: 
1. To manage, support and build interactive learning spaces. This involves supporting, 
reorienting and creating new networks and linkages within and across technologies, 
sectors and markets and around problem-solving (Smits & Kuhlmann, 2004). These 
interactive learning spaces can aid communication, understanding and collaboration 
across boundaries, be they geographical, organizational or disciplinary in nature, and 
thereby increase understanding and build trust between participants. Consequently, they 
can improve policy implementation through increased transparency, legitimacy and 
ownership. (Barré & Keenan, 2008). 
2. Stimulating the identification, articulation and translation of the needs of the poor into 
demand for knowledge. This is an often overlooked but critical component of successful 
interactive learning and innovation (Laestadius, 1998, 2000). Hence, there is a need for 
spaces that can facilitate these activities across subsystems.  
3. Capability building in participants and on a system level with a focus on enhancing 
responsiveness to change and on strategic thinking by developing language and practice 
for thinking about the future (Barré & Keenan, 2008). 
4. Informing policy decision making processes, which concerns generating insights decision 
making regarding the dynamics of change, future challenges and options, along with new 
ideas, and transmitting them to policymakers (Costa et al., 2008). 
5. Facilitating policy implementation via inclusion, which enhances the capability for change 
within a given field by building a common awareness of the current situation and future 
challenges (Costa et al., 2008). A clear benefit of participation is that stakeholders often 
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are much more committed to a plan that they have contributed to designing, which 
facilitates the implementation of decisions. It also implies translating the collective visions 
into specific policy initiatives and a timely plan for implementation.  
6. Embedding participation in innovation policymaking. This corresponds to an 
institutionalization of ISF, which can facilitate the inclusion of civil society and industry 
in the policymaking process, thereby improving its transparency, legitimacy and 
effectiveness (Costa et al., 2008). 
It is important to note that these benefits are exclusively ‘process benefits’ that are not 
possible with limited inclusion (narrow participation). Because policy must be distributed and 
actors are seen as the primary agents of change, innovation system foresight must be 
‘inclusive’ to be transformational. Moreover, ISF places particular emphasis on the micro 
foundations of the innovation system approach, which is interactive learning between users, 
producers and suppliers (Johnson, 2011). These actors require a shared vision to engage in 
successful interactive learning. Vision building can here be understood as bridging/closing 
‘distances’ (e.g., cognitive, cultural) between users and producers to ensure better 
communication. In this way, ISF can enhance the quality and quantity of couplings between 
actors in the economy, which augments the ‘effectiveness’ of innovation systems (Fagerberg 
et al., 2009). In addition, ISF has the potential to strategically affect the direction of 
innovation activities through its function of vision building and influencing actors’ behaviour. 
This led Georghiou (2007) to argue that inclusive forms of foresight may not only make 
successful innovation more likely but also shape the direction of innovation towards solutions 
to problems related to sustainability, poverty, or exclusion.  
3 Analytical framework and methods  
The main line of argumentation in this paper, which is illustrated in figure 2, is that to include 
firms in learning and innovation, we must first include them in designing policies for 
innovation-led development. We suggest that one promising way of doing this is to further 
pursue the ideas embedded in ISF. However, inclusion is only one parameter in ISF. It is thus 
necessary but not sufficient for reorienting innovation systems. We operationalize the four 
points that distinguish ISF from foresight more generally. We propose as the design of a 
foresight more strongly adheres to these points, its likelihood of succeeding in transformative 
change and development due to the process benefits accumulated increases. In the empirical 
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analysis, we focus primarily on how foresight design affects the foresight process; see the 
dotted area at the bottom of figure 2. We have little data on how the latter relates to actual 
policy impact. In the analysis, we thus compare two cases of how foresight design (inclusive 
or not) affects foresight processes, and from that, we make tentative inferences about policy 
effectiveness. Measuring the effect of foresight is generally complicated due to 
counterfactuals and an uncontrollable and complex environment affecting the study object. 
Figure 2: Degrees of ISF and innovation system transformation – analytical framework 
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We analyse two cases of sector foresight from Brazil and South Korea, respectively. The 
countries were chosen for four reasons. First, both have extensive foresight activities and 
programmes targeting innovation and development. Second, both countries struggle to 
support innovation system transformation using foresight and innovation policy. Third, both 
are emerging economies that hold many lessons for other developing countries. It has been 
argued that exchange of the experiences from emerging economies (such as in Asia and South 
America) could be one way to speed up policy learning in other emerging innovation systems 
(such as several African economies) (Lundvall & Lema, 2015). Fourth, the foresight cases 
differ greatly between the countries, which make them interesting for comparison. In the 
following sections, we analyse and compare foresight practice in an organization (South 
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Korea) and one foresight programme (Brazil) involving several actors. We study these 
apparently incomparable entities by focusing on the analytical dimension of foresight design. 
The empirical material builds extensively on Andersen, Andersen, Park, & Cagnin (2014). 
The case analysis will contain three main elements. First, we present a selective description of 
the innovation policy context. Second, we describe the foresight environment and earlier 
experiences. These descriptive parts presented in section four constitute the context wherein 
the individual foresight cases unfold. The third part of the analysis is to assess ISF content in 
the design of selected foresights and how this relates to the foresight process. Our foresight 
cases focus on the level of industrial sectors embedded in a wider national foresight culture. 
We focus on the period from approximately 1990 to 2010 where foresight activities for 
innovation policy took hold. Our data consist of academic publications, foresight reports and 
eight interviews with main actors in Brazil and South Korea conducted in June and July 2012; 
see table 2 in appendix. In the following sections we use numerous abbreviations. The reader 
can find an overview of these in table 3 in the appendix.    
4 Context and case descriptions 
4.1 Policy for Innovation  
4.1.1 Brazil 
In the 1990s, initiatives on innovation policy were crowded out by strict macroeconomic 
policies. Governments abstained from proactive innovation policy which, instead, was left to 
the ‘market forces’. In this period, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT) had 
marginal influence (Koeller & Cassiolato, 2009). Innovation policy gradually returned during 
the 2000s, but competences for public-private dialogue on policy development had 
deteriorated. To restore industrial policy, resources allocated to innovation activities (both 
public and private) increased significantly.
2
 In this context, foresight was seen as a tool for 
restoring such dialogue. 
An important initiative in this context was the Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade 
Policy (PITCE) launched in 2004 by the Ministry for Development, Industry and Trade 
                                                 
2 In 2000, Brazil invested approximately USD 8,327 million in ’scientific and technological activities’, which grew to 
USD 23,453.37 million by 2008 (1.43% of GDP) (RICYT, 2010). 
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(MDIC). At the core of the PITCE was stimulating technological innovation and 
disseminating a pro-innovation discourse through the various ministries. This novel policy 
initiative lacked coordinating organizations and institutional support. Consequently, the 
government created the National Council for Industrial Development (CNDI) to support the 
formulation, implementation and monitoring of the PITCE. The CNDI aimed to give 
coherence to actions and proposals and to strengthen the dialogue between the public and the 
private sector on innovation policy. The Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development (ABDI) 
was created as an executive secretariat for the CNDI. In addition to contributing to policy 
implementation and monitoring, the ABDI also functions as a strategic think tank that 
interacts with industry via institutionalized channels of communication with most Brazilian 
industries in the form of competitiveness forums, trade chambers, sectoral chambers and 
working groups (MDIC, 2010). The ABDI articulates and diffuses the interests of industry in 
the CNDI. The mission of the ABDI is to develop strategic plans for industrial development 
by promoting investment, employment, innovation and competitiveness in Brazilian industry 
(ABDI, 2012). The ABDI occasionally engages in foresighting with the participation of 
industry to develop such plans. It is part of a continuous dialogue that has generated trust 
between all actors (Filho, 2012). 
4.1.2 South Korea 
OECD has recently argued that South Korea faces a challenge of moving from a ‘catching-up’ 
to a ‘creative’ innovation system. South Korea has reached the technological frontier in 
several sectors (particularly ICT) and must now increasingly stimulate innovative and creative 
technological development (OECD, 2009). One challenge is that innovation policy is 
primarily focused on technology-push strategies rather than the diffusion of knowledge and 
interactions among actors (systemic policy). Additionally, the innovation system tends to 
overly favour the incumbent sectors of ICT and machinery manufacturing. Hence, the 
development model of South Korea is changing. Its approach to innovation policy must also 
change (Oh, 2011).  
According to OECD, South Korea must develop a systematic and evolutionary approach to 
the promotion of innovation to support the dynamics and efficiency of innovation processes 
(2009). There is, in other words, a need for systemic policy tools for innovation (Smits & 
Kuhlmann, 2004) required for achieving system transformation, which hinges on distributed 
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innovation policy and inclusive processes, as argued by OECD (2009: 185): “clearly, 
governments alone cannot implement national innovation systems; the form and functioning 
of the latter tend to depend upon the actions of and linkages between a constellation of actors, 
both public and private”. Nonetheless, innovation policy in South Korea is hierarchical and 
centralized (Schlossstein & Park, 2006). Such top-down policy has been effective during the 
catching-up period but is now less suitable. Consequently, there is a growing need for 
inclusive innovation policy in South Korea. In this context, foresight at both national and 
sector levels has been an instrument for addressing the challenges outlined.    
4.2 Foresight experiences 
4.2.1 Brazil  
The first explicit foresight (national) in Brazil was Brazil 2020 (1998), which was the first 
real attempt at ‘integrated governmental planning’. The foresight did not explicitly aim to 
produce guidelines and priorities for public investments, and it can best be understood as an 
early reflection exercise that has contributed to developing the capacity in Brazil for long-
term thinking (Santos & Filho, 2007). The second foresight exercise was the Prospectar 
Programme (2000-2003), which was managed by the MCT, focused on science and 
technology trends and their potential effects on Brazilian industry and society. The 
programme achieved a remarkable mobilization of researchers (over 10,000), which helped 
raise awareness of Brazil’s future challenges and interest in long-term thinking. Problem 
identification and formulation was the main outcome (Popper & Medina, 2008).  
Nearly simultaneously, the MDIC launched the Brazilian Technology Foresight Program 
(2000) with support from UNIDO. The motivation was to assess future challenges and 
opportunities of sectors (production chains) of strategic importance with the goal of 
contributing to industrial competitiveness through technological innovation supported by 
public policies (Santos & Filho, 2007). Several reports were published from the exercise, but 
policymakers struggled to implement the results (Castro & de Castro, 2001; MDIC, 2002). 
According to Aulicino & Kruglianskas (2008), this was because the underlying foresight 
processes did not include important industrial actors. They conclude that the pre-foresight 
process must be more inclusive and involve the key stakeholders to improve their 
understanding of and participation in the process. In 2004, the Nucleus of Strategic Issues of 
the Presidency launched the foresight programme called Brazil 3 Moments project: 2007, 
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2015 and 2022. The programme aimed to define long-term national strategic objectives but 
was not particularly focused on innovation (Popper & Medina, 2008; Santos & Filho, 2007). 
It was created to build an inclusive dialogue between the State and the Brazilian society on 
the values, methods and desirable solutions for reaching strategic goals (Santos & Filho, 
2007). From these foresight activities has emerged the insight that broad inclusion is 
increasingly important for policy and strategy impact.  
4.2.2 South Korea 
In South Korea, foresight is central to innovation policy, which is predominantly managed in 
the form of laws and national plans that coordinate policies and allocate resources to STI. 
These traditional policy instruments have been complemented and informed by development 
of national visions and roadmaps (OECD, 2009). One of the earliest initiatives for spurring 
this transformation was the formulation of ‘Vision 2025’ in 1999, which involved several far-
reaching proposals. As a part of realizing Vision 2025, the government launched the ‘Science 
and Technology Framework Law’ in 2001. It aims at promoting S&T more systematically by 
inter alia developing mid- and long-term strategies and implementation plans, improved rules 
for inter-ministerial coordination, and broad support for R&D activities, S&T agencies and an 
innovation-driven culture. Moreover, based on the Framework Law, the government 
formulated the first ‘5-Year Science and Technology Plan’ and a ‘National Technology Road 
Map’, which were instruments for realizing Vision 2025. The first 5-year plan set out 
priorities for S&T investment, national R&D, and human resource development (MEST, 
2012). The law made it mandatory to carry out a national technological foresight as a basis for 
formulating the 5-year plans. The Korean Institute of Science and Technology Evaluation and 
Planning (KISTEP) manages these foresights (Park & Son, 2010). Foresight is thus formally 
linked to innovation policy in South Korea (STEPI, 2012). 
In terms of foresight design, South Korea found inspiration in Japan for its first foresight in 
1993. It was based on three rounds of Delphi surveys with thousands of experts. The focus 
was on identifying future key technologies without taking into account a social dimension. 
The second South Korean technology foresight was initiated in 1998. The design and 
methodology were similar to those of the first technology foresight (Schlossstein & Park, 
2006). Schlossstein & Park (2006) conclude that these first two national technology foresights 
failed to produce explicit policy implementation as a result of the exclusion of key 
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stakeholders in the South Korean national system of innovation and weak government 
commitment.  
The third South Korean technology foresight was initiated in 2003. It built on the previous 
two but also contained new methodological elements. It went beyond S&T and R&D priority 
setting and set out to match future societal needs and appropriate technological developments. 
Although the matching exercise was a novelty in South Korea, the Delphi technique remained 
the main tool. The foresight consisted of three phases, and the general public (1,000 persons) 
participated only briefly in the first phase. Thus, the exercise was dominated by experts that 
were asked about the future needs of society. The move towards a more ‘inclusive’ 
methodology made the foresight more transparent and useful for policymakers and resulted in 
the direct policy uptake of foresight results for the first time in South Korea (Schlossstein & 
Park, 2006). According to Park & Son (2010), this third technology foresight reflects a 
movement, although limited, towards a systemic understanding of foresight and innovation 
due to the increased focus on social aspects and broader inclusion (policymakers, social 
scientists and citizens were involved, in comparison with earlier reliance on only natural 
scientists and engineers) that was intended to overcome the limited impact of the previous 
foresights (Park & Son, 2010). In addition to the national technology foresights, ‘technology 
road mapping’ is widespread in South Korea. It is the main form of foresight at the sector 
level in South Korea. It is used as strategic and analytical tool by several private actors and 
think tanks. 
In general, foresight activities are confined to being exercises made within ministries with 
participation of academics and experts. This characteristic complicates impact and system 
transformation. Currently, the legacy of top-down policymaking and S&T bias in innovation 
policy are barriers for developing a systemic, inclusive and innovation-oriented type of 
foresight. The national technology foresights and most technology road mapping activities 
tend to be non-systemic, technology-focused, non-inclusive, hierarchical and centralized. In 
accordance, Park & Son (2006) argue that although there are variations in methodology, 
foresight activities in South Korea are oriented towards output products such as scenarios, 
Delphi survey results, and future technology lists, whereas attention to process outcomes such 
as building collective visions and strategies and sharing knowledge is low.  
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4.3 Foresight case description 
4.3.1 Plano Estratégico Setorial  
In Brazil, we focus on a particularly interesting sectoral foresight programme called ‘Plano 
Estratégico Setorial’ (strategic sector plan – PES). It was managed in a collaboration between 
the ABDI and the Center for Strategic Studies and Management in Science, Technology and 
Innovation (CGEE) between 2004 and 2008.  
PES was launched under PICTE to analyse and support sector-specific needs and 
competitiveness in a production-chain perspective with a 15-year time horizon (ABDI, 2012). 
PES contained three steps. First, a panorama analysis (what is the current situation?) was 
performed for each sector. Second, on the basis of the trends, the issues and perspectives 
relevant to a (selected) segment of the sector were identified. Third, building on the first two 
steps, a sector competitiveness agenda (roadmap) was developed to support the formulation 
and implementation of public policies to strengthen competitiveness and innovation (Arcuri, 
2009). PES was partly initiated and managed by the ABDI. It resulted in 11 sectoral foresights 
for sector development strategies that were used as inputs to the discussions in the CNDI. 
These foresights were in turn used to formulate the Productive Development Policy 
programme launched in 2008, the aim of which was to improve long-term competitiveness. 
The foresights were used as inputs to discussions with the private sector to identify and 
develop the necessary actions to build competitiveness. The ABDI contracted the CGEE to 
carry out the foresights in PES.  
4.3.2 Korean Institute for Advancement of Technology  
The main public policy foresight actors in South Korea are the Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology (MEST) and the Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE). Each ministry has 
several affiliated research agencies that perform foresight activities to varying extents. The 
MKE’s mission is to achieve future-oriented industrial development, to strengthen the 
competitiveness of key industries, and to promote new growth engines (OECD, 2009). These 
tasks involve strategy development and implementation, to which foresight is central. The 
MEST is concerned with setting priorities for the long-term direction of S&T development. 
Hence, whereas the MEST is oriented towards S&T (non-industry focus), the MKE is closer 
to industry and more concerned with innovation. In practice, it implies that the MEST focuses 
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on long-run S&T priorities, and the MKE focuses on technology development in the short and 
medium run (KIAT, 2012a).  
We focus on the MKE, under which two agencies, the Korea Institute for Advancement of 
Technology (KIAT) and the Korean Evaluation Institute of Industrial Technology (KEIT), 
manage the majority. Here, we focus on the KIAT, which is the main actor. Foresight in the 
MKE primarily takes the form of technology road mapping, which is currently performed 
yearly for 35 sectors, covering nearly all sectors in South Korea; of those, the KIAT is 
responsible for 20 (KIAT, 2012a). The KIAT aims to develop and coordinate sectoral 
innovation systems and to facilitate interactive innovation processes among key actors (KIAT, 
2012b). The conceptual model used to manage foresight in the KIAT has an explicit focus on 
technology development. The framework contains an analysis of the sector’s strategic 
environment (phase 1), an analysis of sector-internal issues (phase 2), setting goals on basis of 
SWOT analysis (phases 3 and 4), and developing a strategy plan (phase 5;) (KIAT, 2012c; 
Kim, 2012).  
5 Case analysis 
5.1 Goal of foresight 
5.1.1 Plano Estratégico Setorial  
The Plano Estratégico Setorial was intended to increase competitiveness, but more notably, 
the ABDI and the CGEE acknowledged the distributed character of industrial and innovation 
policy, particularly of strategy development for the longer term. This reflects the idea that 
industrial performance is a systemic phenomenon and that the success of (innovation) system 
transformation hinges on the acceptance from key stakeholders. From this perspective, top-
down policy is thus insufficient. Industrial actors must be enrolled in the strategy-
development process. PES thus goes beyond both setting research agendas and expert-based 
foresights to focus on realizing structural change via inclusive processes. Consequently, the 
main goal of PES can be said to be near ISF. 
5.1.2 Korean Institute for Advancement of Technology  
The overall goal of foresight activities in the KIAT is derived from the overall visions of the 
MKE, which, as mentioned, pivots around the creation of new industries, competitiveness and 
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productivity (KIAT, 2012a). However, the KIAT suffers from the institutional structure of 
being delivery agencies for the MKE in the sense that neither of them is much concerned with 
pre-foresight or post-foresight phases but merely performs the foresighting exercise. Their 
objectives are given by the MKE, which expects only a foresight report. This is an 
institutional weakness from the perspective of innovation system foresight. 
5.2 System boundaries 
5.2.1 Plano Estratégico Setorial  
The ABDI initially selected industries to be analysed. Each sector foresight had a steering 
committee with representatives from all stakeholders, including BNDES, the MCT, FINEP, 
sectoral organizations (national-level industry unions), the CGEE, the ABDI, and others. 
Committees decided guidelines and followed the process closely. Committees decided 
industry boundaries and who would be relevant actors to include (Campanhola, 2012). In the 
pre-foresight phase, the ABDI insisted on using private business consultants to avoid the 
CGEE’s usual reliance on only university researchers. Consultants would be more pragmatic 
and focus more on ‘market aspects’, it was believed (Campanhola, 2012). The ABDI wanted 
to reorient the CGEE towards a more industrially inclusive approach to foresight. Thus, there 
was no systematic methodology or underlying theory for setting boundaries. Nonetheless, the 
negotiation process reflects that the ABDI insisted on avoiding an (top-down) expert-based 
foresight. 
5.2.2 Korean Institute for Advancement of Technology  
The KIAT does not have an explicit methodology for setting sector boundaries (Kim, 2012). 
The MKE decides such boundaries, often via industry codes (KIAT, 2012a). 
5.3 Inclusion  
5.3.1 Plano Estratégico Setorial  
The identification and enrolment of actors to participate in foresights was a crucial aspect of 
the PES studies. The ABDI carefully chose key stakeholders from each industrial sector to be 
part of the project. The ABDI’s major goal was to persuade and to gain commitments from 
the committee representatives who could help organize the sector while improving its global 
competitiveness (Nehme et al., 2011: p. 5-6). The process was complicated, though. Firms 
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insisted on solving short-term problems regarding interest rates and infrastructure and were 
not interested in or accustomed to long-term strategic thinking. The ABDI invested significant 
resources in gradually trying to convince them (and government officials) about the 
usefulness of foresight via training and workshops. The ABDI succeeded due to three factors.  
First, the ABDI was created to fill a vacuum in industrial policy in Brazil, and together with 
other policies (e.g., the PITCE), it reflects the determination in the government to pursue 
economic development through industrial policies that should pivot around science and 
technology. Industry perceived the latter as a business-friendly agenda and as a window of 
opportunity for actually influencing the political agenda (Alvarez, 2012). Second, as a new 
organization, the ABDI was determined and eager to prove itself by committing industry to 
programmes focusing on long-term policy and development strategies instead of indulging 
industry’s obsession with short-term problems (Alvarez, 2012). Moreover, according to the 
ABDI Director Clayton Campanhola (2012), the ABDI had a ‘good name’, i.e., is an actor 
respected and trusted by industry. Third, simultaneously with the foresights, the ABDI 
launched a number of consultancy projects focusing on short-term problem-solving for 
industries. Seen in the total budget of the PES, these short-term investments were insignificant, 
but they reflected a compromise between short- and long-term issues. These projects were 
used as ‘bait’ for industry commitment and made industrial actors experienced that they had 
influence, which in turn earned the ABDI and PES legitimacy (Alvarez, 2012).  
Hence, PES intentionally crafted broad inclusion from industrial actors to facilitate industry 
transformation. Although it does not appear explicitly from our data, we may say that the 
design of PES had strong links between the pre-foresight and post-foresight phases. The 
ABDI/CNDI’s mandate ensured political awareness and the extensive inclusion of industry 
actors facilitated their cooperation.   
5.3.2 Korean Institute for Advancement of Technology  
The number of persons participating in the KIAT’s technology road mapping has been 
increasing. Now, approximately 700 experts participate in the 35 yearly mapping exercises. 
They are organized in expert groups consisting of approximately 20 persons each and come 
equally from universities, research organizations and industry (KIAT, 2012a). However, 
according to Professor Karpsoo Kim, the increasing number does not change the fact that 
technology road mapping is generally a top-down method for strategy development, whereas 
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foresight is a bottom-up method (Kim, 2012). According to Kim, the KIAT’s technology road 
mapping is essentially expert-driven and technology-focused without any broader inclusion of 
stakeholders. 
5.4 Mapping the system 
5.4.1 Plano Estratégico Setorial  
Mapping the system created challenges for the CGEE because sectors differed significantly, 
forcing the CGEE to develop its own sector foresight model (Filho, 2012). It looks at each 
sector in six dimensions (general views) of society (Market, Social, Economic, Technological, 
Innovation, Competitive Strategies). The external and general trends are combined with a 
sector-specific analysis, where the focus is put on new players, main competitor countries and 
leader companies in the production chain. The production chain analysis looks at talent, 
infrastructure, investments, policy and institutions, design, and other ‘specific’ dimensions. It 
furthermore emphasizes the relationships between suppliers, producers and users in the chain 
as important for understanding needs (Filho, 2010). The dimensions are chosen based on 
SWOT, STEEPV, or general experience. Although the CGEE ad-hoc model is not linked to 
innovation system thinking, it reflects a systemic approach to both foresight and innovation. 
5.4.2 Korean Institute for Advancement of Technology  
There is no overarching theoretically anchored method for mapping the sectors (Kim, 2012). 
The models illustrated apply standard foresight instruments such as SWOT, STEEP, 
patents/scientific papers and quantitative value chain analysis. 
6 Concluding remarks 
The Plano Estratégico Setorial and previous foresight activities in Brazil can be seen as 
attempts to develop systemic innovation policy tools and to institutionalize them. The main 
lesson from PES is that systemic and inclusive foresight design generates inclusive 
policymaking processes that, in turn, increase the likelihood of significant policy impact. The 
successful inclusion of industrial actors is an interesting feature of PES. It is a general 
challenge for foresight to achieve this. We can draw five lessons from PES on this topic.  
First, meaningful inclusion requires that industry representatives have knowledge of foresight 
and strategic innovation policy and consider it important, which implies training and dialogue. 
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The ABDI and the CGEE organized training in the pre-foresight phase. Second, PES indicates 
that trust and dialogue between industry and government is a premise for enrolment and in 
turn meaningful participation. Industry must also be convinced that there is a real opportunity 
for influence. Third, a unique feature of PES was the management of trade-offs between 
short-term problem solving and strategy development for the longer term. This may hold a 
key lesson for sector foresight in general. These three points all concern the inclusion of firms 
that initially wanted to be excluded. Fourth, during PES, the CGEE experienced that firms 
changed perception of the project from disbelief to engagement. Hence, included actors 
learned new things during the processes. Fifth, PES indicates that both the institutionalized 
dialogue that the ABDI had with industries and the dialogue taking place during PES were 
very important for identifying and articulating the needs of industries and for building trust.  
PES was an experiment in identifying and formulating future needs for 11 industries. The 
companies alone would not have initiated such an experiment (Filho, 2012). The ABDI thus 
functioned as a ‘bridging organization’ (see Boon, Moors, Kuhlmann, & Smits, 2011) 
between industry, government and research. Such organizations seem indispensable when 
going beyond expert-based foresight. PES indicates that a continuous public-private dialogue 
about what constitutes current problems and a desirable future is a central part of managing 
innovation system transformation. On basis of our analysis, we evaluate the foresight design 
of PES to be reasonably similar to what we have identified as ISF; see table 1.  
The design of foresight in the KIAT seems to be primarily top-down, expert based, not 
theory-based, short term, product oriented, technology focused, and non-systemic. In this 
context, it is interesting to observe that the KIAT identifies the poor diffusion of results, a 
weak industry impact, and the analysis of contextual factors as their main challenges. The 
KIAT tries to diffuse results through hearings, meetings and engagement with industry, but 
the impact remains weak (KIAT, 2012a, 2012c). Moving towards a systemic, inclusive and 
innovation-oriented foresight style might alleviate the KIAT’s challenges. A potential barrier 
for directly including more diverse actors can be found in South Korea’s industrial structure. 
According to Sarpoo Kim, the multinational enterprises (Chaebols) are too strong to be 
bothered with what the KIAT and the MKE do, whereas the small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) are too weak to benefit from the results (Kim, 2012). According to the 
KIAT, it is difficult to establish contact with industry, particularly SMEs. South Korea does 
not have capable industry associations (potential bridging organizations). Most of them have 
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only 4-5 employees and are weak in terms of resources and capabilities (KIAT, 2012a). In 
contrast to the PES case, there seems to be a lack of ‘bridging organizations’ such as the 
ABDI and representatives for industrial actors that are able to proactively participate in 
foresights. The KIAT’s foresight design and associated policymaking processes are not very 
inclusive and are thus far from the ideas of ISF; see table 1. Hence, by negative example, the 
KIAT’s foresight activities suggest the same conclusion as PES, which is that foresight has 
potential as an inclusive and systemic innovation policy tool. This potential is exploited only 
when foresight is designed according to the insights of ISF. This is because foresight (and 
innovation policy, more generally) must be inclusive to be transformational, which implies 
that the actors in the system of innovation are the principal agents of change—the gatekeepers, 
so to speak. 
This conclusion lends support to the broader propositions of this paper, i.e., including (often 
uninterested) firms in learning and innovation activities requires that they first be included in 
collective public-private strategy development processes leading to innovation and 
development strategies to feel ownership of policies, to have influence on them, and to 
understand and learn about them. Moving towards such practices in innovation policymaking 
is one way of making innovation systems more inclusive and thus to promote inclusive 
development. Accepting the argument implies that governments should invest in inclusive 
public-private dialogue about future-oriented innovation and development policies guided by 
a systemic understanding of innovation. Moreover, governments should focus more on the 
process benefits of inclusion and support the formation of bridging organizations in industry. 
National investment priorities in innovation, which significantly affect the direction of 
innovation and thus the transformation of IS, are often selected in a relatively top-down 
manner. Its principal methodology is expert-based working groups (with academic bias) and 
questionnaires surveying thousands of experts. The underlying logic and perception of 
innovation is informed by the so-called linear model of innovation, which is a problematic 
practice because we know that innovation is predominantly a systemic phenomenon. We have 
argued here that innovation system informed type of foresight (i.e. ISF) can support better 
decision making in and the impact of such investments. This is particularly true in developing 
economies, where innovation systems are often fragmented (Szogs et al., 2011). Such 
countries are in need of systemic, forward-looking and inclusive tools for ‘wiring up’ and 
transforming their embryonic systems of innovation. This paper constitutes a first tentative 
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step towards finding a way forward. To build on and further explore this potential requires 
more conceptual work and empirical studies in developing countries.  
Table 1: Summing up case studies 
  Plano Estratégico Setorial Korean Institute for Advancement of Technology 
Characteristic ISF 
“Score”* 
Characteristic ISF 
“Score”* 
G
o
a
l 
o
f 
fo
re
s
ig
h
t Effective industrial policy; 
transforming industrial system   
System transformation focus is 
important. It makes you identify 
actors as gatekeepers. 
  
(++) 
New industries and technologies by setting 
priority lists for investment in S&T rather than 
generating change 
This type of expert-based screening for 
future technologies must be seen as only 
one input to actual foresight and not end 
product 
  
(+) 
D
e
fi
n
in
g
 s
y
s
te
m
 Ad hoc and weak innovation focus 
but with systemic understanding 
of performance  
Illustrate that absence of explicit 
method for delimitating system of 
interest leads to ad hoc solutions 
  
(++) 
The MKE decides sector boundaries via 
industry codes.  
Non-systemic understanding of performance 
and innovation 
Illustrate that absence of explicit method for 
delimitating system of interest leads to ad 
hoc solutions 
  
(+) 
In
c
lu
s
io
n
 
Broad inclusion 
Illustrate necessity of enrolling 
industry and how to do it (short- 
vs. long-term trade-off, trust) 
  
(+++) 
Narrow inclusion, expert-based Delphi 
700 experts organized yearly in expert 
groups. Nonetheless, top-down, expert-
driven and technology-focused method for 
strategy development without broader 
participation of stakeholders from the 
Innovation System. 
Shows necessity of enrolling industry though 
by negative example.  
  
(+) 
  
M
a
p
p
in
g
 Ad hoc design based on SWOT 
and STEEPV but with significant 
systemic features 
  
(++) 
Standard foresight instruments such as 
SWOT, STEEP, patents/scientific papers 
Ad hoc and S&T focused (linear 
understanding of innovation) 
  
(+) 
* The number of (+) indicates the degree of similarity with ISF; (+) weak, (++) moderate, (+++) strong 
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MDIC Ministry for Development, Industry and Trade Brazil 
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MKE Ministry of Knowledge Economy South Korea 
PES Plano Estratégico Setorial’ (strategic sector plan) Brazil 
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